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15. Community Renegades: Micro-radio 
and the Unlicensed Radio Movement 
LAWRENCE C. SOLEY 
When police beat Dewayne Readus during a 1983 scuffle at the John Hay 
Homes housing project in Springfield, Illinois, they were no more aware 
that their actions would lead to a large-scale revolt than were the Los 
Angeles cops who beat Rodney King eight years later. Unlike the revolt in 
Los Angeles, the one that started in Springfield was nonviolent, invisible, 
and international. It triggered the micro-radio revolt of the 1990s-an 
explosion of unlicensed, low-power radio stations that originated in, and 
broadcast to, neighborhoods across the United States and across the globe. 
Dewayne Readus grew up in the John Hay Homes public housing project, 
a 600-unit complex of low-rise apartments for low-income families a short 
distance from President Abraham Lincoln's historic home. In the 1980s, 
the project was home to approximately 3,000 people, the vast majority of 
whom were African American. No commercial broadcasting stations were 
directed to Springfield's 15,000 African Americans, most of whom lived 
within a one-and-a-half-mile radius of the John Hay project. 
In 1983, Readus, partially blinded by glaucoma as a child, was like many 
young African American men-unable to find a full-time or even a part-
time job. To earn money, Readus became a disc jockey at project parties, 
spinning R&B discs and getting drunk. One of these parties turned into a 
brawl and the police were called. Readus was so severely beaten by police 
during the ensuing turmoil that he was completely blinded. After that, he 
became depressed and drank heavily (M. Kantako, personal communica-
tion,July 8,1996). 
After shaking his depression, Readus became interested in social activ-
ism and police accountability rather than parties and booze. In 1985, he 
helped organize the Tenants Rights Association (TRA), which demanded 
that Hay Homes authorities be accountable to project residents, rather than 
the other way around. 
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To improve TRA's outreach, Mike Townsend, a family friend and professor 
at Sangamon State University, now called the University of Illinois at Spring-
field, suggested that Readus start a neighborhood newspaper. Readus, who 
later changed his name to Mbanna Kantako (or "resisting warrior"), replied, 
"I'm blind, let's do radio. I don't get off on print that much" (M. Townsend, 
personal communication, July 8,1996). 
In addition to Kantako's blindness, there were other reasons the TRA 
needed to use radio. Kantako explains, "Studies show that 40 percent of 
black men are illiterate. Newspapers can't get them any information ... 
Besides, given technology today, using print is like using the pony express 
instead of air freight delivery" (quoted in Shields & Ogles, 1995) . 
At the next meeting of the TRA, members discussed "the most effective 
way of getting our message to the people," Kantako says. The group dis-
cussed the legality of operating an FM station without a license from the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC). TheoTRA members weighed 
the legality of operating a transmitter, and concluded that the benefits 
outweighed the risks. "We were not even concerned about the FCC regula-
tions. Clearly they were designed before blacks were allowed to hold their 
heads up," Kantako said about the decision. "And, obviously, being designed 
at that period of time, there was no consideration of what we as people 
might want to do" (LeBlanc, 1990). 
Despite being illegal, the TRA decided to put an FM station on the air 
using money from a Catholic Church Campaign for Human Development 
grant. "We got the equipment ... for about $600 out of a catalog," says 
Kantako. They purchased a I-watt Panaxis transmitter, assembled it them-
selves, adjusted it for 107.1 MHz so as not to interfere with existing stations, 
put up an antenna, and made their first broadcast on November 27, 1986, 
from the living room of Kantako's apartment. 
The station was named for the association and given the call letters 
'''TRA. At its inception, about a dozen Hay Homes residents worked on 
vVTRA, whose signal was audible only within a mile-and-a-half of the trans-
mitter. Nevertheless, the micro-power station reached most of Springfield's 
African American residents. 
Initially, vVTRA was on the air for just two nights per week, broadcasting 
live. In 1988, the station went to three nights per week, 12 hours per night 
(6 p.m. to 6 a.m.), carrying commentary, news reports, and music. The sta-
tion also changed its name to Zoom Black Magic Liberation Radio to reflect 
its broader outlook, which was "to build community" and "raise the conscious-
ness of the people" (M. Kantako, personal communication,July 8, 1996). 
Around this time, Zoom Black Magic Liberation Radio started airing com-
plaints about police brutality. The station also demanded that an independent 
police review board be established in Springfield. The predominantly white 
city council held a hearing on this issue and rejected the proposal. 
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The Springfield police chief contacted the FCC, claiming that he had 
received complaints about the station's use of profanity. Responding to the 
police chiefs complaint, FCC agents visited the station on April 6, 1989, 
and determined that Kantako was operating without a license. He was 
ordered to stop broadcasting and slapped with a $750 fine. 
Kantako shut the station down that day, but started it up again on April 17 
during a press conference in which he demanded that the police arrest him 
for operating the station. When the police refused, Kantako went to the 
federal building in Springfield, where he asked to be arrested by U.S. 
marshals, who also refused. Because of these confrontations, Kantako 
decided to put the station on 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, which is how it 
operated until 2000, when the FCC finally seized the station's transmitter. 
It later reappeared on the Internet at http: //www.humanrightsradio.net. 
In 1989, the station was renamed Black Liberation Radio (BLR) to 
reflect its political outlook. It has since been called African Liberation Radio 
and Human Rights Radio, reflecting the changing perspective of Kantako 
and his associates. "We're learning as we go," said Kantako about the changes. 
"We named our original organization the name that we thought was a solu-
tion to our problems-the Tenant's Rights Association. We thought if we got 
tenant's rights-boom-everything would fall into place. We learned that 
wasn't the case" (Personal communication, July 8, 1996) . 
In March 1990, a federal court ordered Kantako to shut down his trans-
mitter. Kantako ignored the order but did contact the San Francisco-based 
National Lawyers Guild Committee on Democratic Communications, 
formed in 1987 to explore "the applicability of traditional First Amendment 
concepts in the face of the worldwide monopolization of communication 
resources by commercial interests." 
"I got an e-mail from Mike Townsend," said attorney Peter Franck, then 
co-chair with Sally Harms of the National Lawyers League Committee, about 
his first contact with BLR (Personal communication, March 5, 1997). "We 
felt what they were doing was very important. The choice was to either 
reform the existing media or start your own," said Franck, who doubts that 
the existing, corporate-controlled media can be reformed. 
After discussing the case, the committee decided to take on Kantako's 
case. "We debated whether we should go to court affirmatively to try and get 
the ban on low-power radio ruled unconstitutional," said Franck, but 
"Mbanna wasn't very anxious to go to court. He didn 't have much faith in 
the courts. And our feeling was that going in affirmatively makes it tougher 
to win than if we are defending him against a criminal charge or action." 
The brief was never filed on Kantako's behalf because the FCC backed 
away from the confrontation. Although the brief was not filed, it was not 
wasted-it was later revised and submitted on behalf of Free Radio Berkeley, 
an unlicensed station that challenged FCC licensing policies in 1993. 
264 III LAWRENCE C. SOLEY 
The first station inspired by Kantako's example and the second 
micro-power station to take to the air was BLR of Decatur. Like Springfield, 
which is 40 miles west, Decatur is a predominantly white city that dilutes 
minority representation through at-large elections, ties to business, and a 
police force that does not hesitate to use force against political dissidents, 
minorities, and union workers, as demonstrated during the Caterpillar, 
Bridgestone, and Staley strikes (Franklin, 1994; Chicago Sun Times, 1994). 
Started by Napoleon Williams and Mildred Jones on August 20, 1990, 
BLR broadcast from a studio in the couple's small west-side home using a 
less than I-watt Panaxis transmitter tuned to 107.3 MHz FM, a vacant 
frequency in the Decatur-Springfield radio market. The station was 
created to give Decatur's African American community uncensored access 
to the airwaves. A leaflet distributed in the African American community to 
announce its sign-on reported that BLR would give "a voice to those who 
have no voice of their own through the mass medial' (BLR Leaflet, n .d.). 
"We want[ed] total community involvement, so anybody can be on the 
air," Williams said about the station's philosophy in 1996. "If you have a prob-
lem with the judicial system, you don't have to call Napoleon Williams and 
ask him, 'What can you do?' You can come on and present your case to the 
people. There may be someone out there that will hear you, who has had the 
same problem and knows what to do." In Williams's view, radio should oper-
ate like public access channels on cable television, where interested groups 
and individuals can produce and air programs (Personal communication, 
July 9,1996). 
The FCC also visited this station, ordered Williams to stop broadcasting, 
and slapped him with a $17,500 fine. "I told them ifI got $17,500, come and 
get it ... Hell, ifI had $17,500, I'd have a better radio station than this," said 
Williams (Personal communication,July 9, 1996), who ignored the agency 
and continued to broadcast. 
BLR never had a specific schedule during the week; only a few hours 
daily were devoted to scheduled programs. Most mornings, Williams did a 
show in which he discussed and reinterpreted news stories reported that 
day by the corporate press. "A lot of people don't buy the newspaper because 
they know Napoleon's going over it," said Jones about the show (M.Jones, 
personal communication,July 9, 1996). 
After that, the station often played music, sometimes with Jones as disc 
jockey. On some nights, a live call-in show, Hot Line, was featured. Music 
programs by disc jockeys such as DJ. Ice also aired on weekdays. About the 
schedule, Williams said, "Throughout the day, you're going to find some-
thing you dislike and then, if you listen long enough, something you're 
going to like-that's guaranteed." 
In May 1996, a commercial, album-oriented rock station in a nearby city 
signed onto 107.3 MHz, forcing BLR to change frequencies. Because he 
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needed to shut down the station to alter its frequency, Williams decided it 
might be a good idea to install a new, more powerful transmitter at that time. 
To buy a new transmitter, Williams conducted a one-day fundraiser over 
the air, asking listeners to drop $5 off on Saturday. Very late on Friday, 
''''iIIiams heard a knock on the door. \\'hen opened, there stood a local 
gang member who said, ''I'm going to pay for 20 brothers right now," and 
handed Williams $100. During the next 24 hours, Williams was given more 
than $1 ,000, almost all of it in $5 donations. 
The money was enough to buy a 15-watt transmitter, a new antenna, 
and even a meter to check the transmitter's output. The new transmitter 
allowed BLR to broadcast on 107.7 MHz to most of Decatur, rather than just 
its east or west sides. 
The new transmitter was not in operation long, however. OnJanuary 9, 
1997, the home of Williams and Jones was raided by the police, who had a 
search warrant allowing them to seize electronic equipment that could be 
used for "evesdropping" (Macon County, 1997) . The allegations were not 
contained in the search warrant, but Williams allegedly taped his conversa-
tions with public officials without getting their permission, which is a felony 
in Illinois. (In most states, this taping is legal.) Rather than seizing tapes 
and tape recorders, the police seized every piece of broadcasting equip-
ment in the house, suggesting that the raid was an attempt to force BLR off 
the air. 
After news about the raid got out, BLR received help getting back on 
the air from many sources. Money, tapes, and tape recorders were brought 
to the station by supporters, and Stephen Dunifer, founder of Free Radio 
Berkeley, sent Williams a new transmitter. With this help, BLR was back on 
the air in a few weeks. 
The RebeUion Spreads 
Williams's belief that radio stations should function like public access chan-
nels, rather than as producers of pabulum and profits, was also held by Tom 
Reveille, who in 1991 started Radio Free Venice, California's first micro-
power station. "In my view, we have a media government. If you need infor-
mation, you can only get it from the media .... They have a stranglehold on 
information," Reveille said about the corporate media, which dominate 
the U.S. airwaves (Personal communication, December 27, 1996). "This is 
the only war in history, where one side gets all of its information from the 
other side." 
Inspired by the example of Mbanna Kantako, Reveille decided to start an 
unlicensed station, where listeners could become program producers. "It was 
open to the community on an equal basis. It was quite a heterogeneous 
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mixture of people on the air," he said. The station was open about its location, 
provided its telephone number to listeners and, for a studio, Reveille used the 
enclosed porch on the house where he lived, so that passersby could see the 
studio, and come in and talk, if they so wished. 
The FCC took advantage of the station's openness. On May 29, FCC 
agents, backed by Los Angeles cops, showed up at Reveille's door, and 
informed him that he was breaking the law. Reveille responded that they 
were violating the law because Congress gave the FCC jurisdiction over 
interstate and foreign communications, not micro-radio, where signals 
barely travel two miles. The police responded to Reveille's comments by 
grabbing and handcuffing him. He was released when they and the FCC 
agents left. 
Despite the FCC visit, Radio Free Venice remained on the air. ""''hat 
wasn't important was the station, but to challenge the FCC," Reveille said 
about his decision to continue broadcasting. The--FCC responded to the 
challenge on November 13, when two agents and four federal marshals 
again visited and entered Reveille's residence with guns drawn. "They 
ransacked the rooms of people who had nothing to do with the station," 
Reveille says about the raid. "They didn't take the antenna, [but] they 
took cash, videotapes, 160 audiotapes, files-everything they damn well 
pleased." Reveille never got the equipment or his personal possessions 
back, and the station never returned to the air (Personal communication, 
December 27,1996) . 
As the FCC was silencing Radio Free Venice, another free station calling 
itself KAPW signed on in Phoenix, Arizona. The station was operated by Bill 
Dougan on 88.9 MHz from his home. Unlike Tom Reveille, a politically 
dedicated libertarian, Dougan was not involved in political activities before 
getting involved in radio. He had written a few letters to the editor, but not 
much more. This changed in 1988 when commercial station KFYI-FM 
dropped talk show host Tom Leykis, to whom Dougan listened almost daily. 
To get Leykis back on the air, Dougan initiated a boycott of KFYI advertis-
ers; the station responded by suing Dougan for interfering with their busi-
ness. Faced with the expenses of defending himself from KFYI's suit, Dougan 
called off the boycott (Wagner, 1994). 
The experience left Dougan disenchanted with commercial radio, so he 
decided to start a noncommercial station, which he dubbed "Arizona's Most 
Controversial Station." KAPW aired a variety of materials, including tapes of 
"controversial" speakers such as Madalyn Murray O'Hair, Native American 
music, and public affairs shows-but not for long. On March 12, 1992, FCC 
agents showed up at Dougan's door, asking to see the transmitter. He 
refused to allow the agents in-or so the FCC says-but he invited in repre-
sentatives of the news media, who had gathered outside his home. The FCC 
responded by fining Dougan $17,500 (FCC, 1996). 
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Dougan shut down his station, but appealed the fine in the U.S. Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, where he argued that the FCC's restrictions on 
low-power broadcasting were unconstitutional. The National Lawyers Guild 
Committee on Democratic Communications filed a friend-of-the-court brief 
in that case, based largely on the research that they had done for Mbanna 
Kantako, but the court did not reach a decision, ruling instead that 
the proper jurisdiction for the case was Federal District Court (Dougan v. 
FCC, 1994). 
Dougan returned to the air in 1994, after Radio Free Berkeley, defended 
by the Committee on Democratic Communications, beat back FCC attempts 
to silence that station. Dougan's new station, called KAFR or Arizona Free 
Radio, was created as "a refreshing change from far-right hate radio," carry-
ing many of the same program types that appeared earlier on Free Radio 
Berkeley, such as a gay and lesbian show, women's programs, and punk rock 
music (Newberg, 1995). 
Two other stations inspired by Kantako's example were Radio Free 
Detroit and Black Liberation Radio 2, which broadcast to Richmond, 
Virginia. Radio Free Detroit, although inspired by Zoom Black Magic Radio, 
differed from its inspiration in several ways. The station was secretive about 
its location and sponsorship, never recruited citizens to produce programs 
or otherwise participate in the station's operations, and never directly chal-
lenged the FCC, as Kantako, Williams, and Reveille had. Instead of opening 
the station to the public, all of the programming was produced by "the RFD 
collective." The station broadcast on 106.3 MHz, near the top of the FM 
band. The FCC apparently learned about the station from an article in The 
Fifth Estate, Detroit's alternative weekly newspaper. "''hen the FCC showed 
up at the operators' door, accompanied by a few cops and a television crew 
trying to do a story on the station, Radio Free Detroit was silenced. 
Black Liberation Radio 2 was on the air between December 29, 1994, 
and June 25, 1995. The station was started by Jahi Kubweza, who became 
"tired of being bombarded by lies." Kubeweza said, "We took it upon our-
selves to show the difference between the information being made available 
and the information withheld" (Personal communication,January 2, 1996) . 
Black Liberation Radio 2 featured programs on economics, govern-
ment, health, and a host of other issues, along with poetry and rap, reggae, 
jazz, and instrumental music. It directly challenged the FCC by operating 
on 91 .7 MHz, 24 hours per day, 7 days per week wi th 30 watts of power. 
FCC agents paid the station a visit on June 25 and asked to see the 
transmitter. "I made a mistake," Kubweza says about his decision to allow 
the agents in. Once in, they seized the transmitter, the antenna, and all 
other electronic equipment that was visible- even equipment that had 
nothing to do with the station. Kubweza was prosecuted and eventually 
convicted for operating the station (FCC, 2001). 
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Although the FCC believed that it could stop the growing micro-power 
radio revolution by issuing fines and seizing transmitters, it was wrong. 
The Case of Free Radio Berkeley 
Berkeley and San Francisco, birthplaces of the free speech and countercul-
tural movements of the 1960s, became the center of the micro-radio revolu-
tion around 1993. The free-radio revolution shifted to the California Bay 
Area, where the National Lawyers Guild Committee on Democratic Com-
munications was based, and where Stephen Dunifer, a former broadcast 
engineer for commercial radio and television stations, lived. Dunifer started 
Free Radio Berkeley as a direct challenge to the FCC's ban on low-power 
broadcasting and as a laboratory for developing and distributing a low-
cost, micro-power transmitter that could be used bJ'"community groups and 
citizen activists. 
Before putting Free Radio Berkeley on the air, Dunifer designed and 
tested several homemade FM transmitters in his workshop-home above an 
electronics repair store in "Vest Berkeley. Dunifer's residence consisted of 
two bedrooms, a living room, and a workshop larger than all the other 
rooms combined. In the workshop, he winnowed his prototype FM 
transmitters down to one that was small, portable, stable, and inexpensive. 
In April 1993, Dunifer began broadcasting on Sunday nights between 
9 p.m. and 10 p.m. from his workshop-home, announcing, "This is Free 
Radio Berkeley, 88.1 on your FM dial." Shortly after Free Radio Berkeley 
signed on, San Francisco-based FCC agents monitored the IS-watt broad-
casts, which denounced the FCC for promoting corporate interests rather 
than the public interest, an issue that Dunifer hammered at consistently.l 
"'Ne are attempting to redress a greater wrong that is essentially a theft of 
the people's airwaves by corporate interests that have hijacked the whole 
thing," Dunifer said about his motivations for starting the unlicensed 
station (Personal communication, March 4, 1996). 
Agents with the FCC's compliance bureau in San Francisco visited 
Berkeley on April 23, 1993, where the unlicensed station's "signals were 
isolated by the agent to the vicinity of 6th Street and Alliston Way" (FCC, 
1995). A week later, several agents returned to Berkeley, where they parked 
and waited for the station to return to the air. At 9 p.m. as usual, Free Radio 
Berkeley signed on. ""'hen the transmissions began, the agents turned on 
their "close-in direction finding equipment" and locked onto the transmis-
sions originating from Dunifer's workshop-home, which they identified as 
the source of the unlicensed messages. 
At 9:55 p.m., one of the agents knocked on Dunifer's door and asked 
whether he could inspect the station's transmitter. Dunifer refused to open 
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his door, so the agent went back to his car, where he and his cohorts waited 
to see what would happen next. A short time later, the agents noticed a 
longhaired, bearded fellow wearing wire-rimmed glasses leave the premises 
that they had staked out. One of the agents accosted the fellow, who refused 
to identify himself. The agents later identified him as Stephen Paul Dunifer, 
a Berkeley anarchist and radical activist. 
Dunifer says that he expected the visit from the FCC. One reason for 
going on the air was to challenge the FCC rules prohibiting micro-power 
broadcasting, but before the rules could be challenged in court, he had to 
be cited by the FCC. "The first broadcasts were made from a fixed location 
to get the attention of the FCC," Dunifer says. The broadcasts were "an 
absolute attempt to challenge directly the FCC's regulatory structure and 
policies. Based on the work of the National Lawyer Guild Committee on 
Democratic Communications [in the Kantako case], I felt sure we had a 
very solid legal basis to proceed on if we could find a proper venue," he said 
(Personal communication, March 4, 1996). 
However, once the FCC identified Dunifer's workshop-home as the 
source of the broadcasts, the "station went mobile," operating that way for a 
year and a half- until the end of 1994. "The transmitters were put into 
backpacks along with other portable studio equipment and were all hiked 
up into the hills of Berkeley," Dunifer explained. A battery was lugged along 
to provide electrical power for the transmitter, which went on the air 
Sundays from 9 p.m. to midnight, airing tapes made by community groups, 
local bands, and even interviews. 
Because the station continued to broadcast, the FCC served a Notice of 
Apparent Liability for $20,000 on Dunifer on June 1, telling him that Free 
Radio Berkeley had been monitored broadcasting from his residence on 
April 25 and May 2. Louis ("Luke") Hiken, a San Francisco attorney and 
member of the National Lawyers Guild Committee on Democratic Commu-
nications, drafted Dunifer's response to the notice. The response noted that 
the FCC's fine was "grossly disproportionate to the alleged violations ... and 
exceeds the maximum set by statute." Moreover, the response laid out the 
arguments that would later be raised in U.S. District Court, where the FCC 
tried to get an injunction to stop Dunifer from broadcasting. It noted that 
FCC policies were developed "before the advent of FM broadcasting" and 
"failed to keep pace with .. . technological advances" such as highly stable 
low-power FM transmitters, which provide poor people, rather than just 
large corporations, with access to the broadcasting spectrum (Hiken, 
1993). 
The FCC officials, of course, rejected all of these arguments in their 
brief, filed on November 8,1993, explaining that they had the sole power to 
determine the public interest. In response, Hiken filed an appeal called an 
Application for Review in Washington, DC, on December 2,1993. 
270 III LAWRENCE C. SOLEY 
In addition to getting the National Lawyers Guild to represent him, 
Dunifer did several things that the FCC did not expect. He took his case 
public , began showing others how they could start their own radio 
stations, and continued to broadcast. To publicize his case, Dunifer sent 
press releases to alternative, local, and national media and made himself 
available for interviews. The first stories about Dunifer appeared in Bay 
Area newspapers, such as the San Francisco Chronicle, which reported that 
Dunifer and his colleagues were "encouraging other people" to start up sta-
tions. "They offer free workshops on how to build miniature radio stations 
for less than $200," an article reported (Herscher, 1993). Stories about Free 
Radio Berkeley also appeared on CNN and in The New York Times, but what 
garnered publicity for the station was the FBI's attempt to link Bay Area 
radicals to the Unabomber. According to the FBI, ari anonymous tipster 
identified Dunifer as the Unabomber, and an FBI agent decided to pay 
Dunifer a visit. Because of the FBI visit, Dunifer's-fight with the FCC was 
reported in the Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, and other large daily 
newspapers (Noble, 1995; Achenbach, 1995;Jacobs, 1995) . 
Soon thereafter, another Bay Area micro-power FM station, San Fran-
cisco Liberation Radio (SFLR), appeared on 93.7 MHz. Started by activists 
Jo Swanson and Richard Edmondson, the station followed in the footsteps 
of Radio Free Berkeley, becoming mobile. During its initial months of oper-
ation, the station broadcast from different locations, hoping to avoid being 
tracked and silenced by the FCC. Rather than broadcasting just one night a 
week as Free Radio Berkeley did, SFLR was on two nights, Wednesdays and 
Saturdays, from 8 p.m. to lO p.m. 
Mter learning that Edmondson operated SFLR, the FCC issued him a 
Notice of Liability containing a $10,000 fine. Edmondson, like Dunifer, 
turned to Luke Hiken for legal assistance and then kept on broadcasting 
(Nessie, 1997). 
Rather than quickly denying Dunifer's Application for Review, which 
would have allowed Hiken to appeal the denial in court, the FCC took a 
different approach. The agency let the Application for Review languish in 
Washington , DC, for lO months and then filed in U.S. District Court in 
California for an injunction ordering Dunifer to stop broadcasting. The 
FCC reasoned that if it received the injunction, Dunifer could be cited for 
violating the court order when broadcasting, rather than for violating FCC 
regulations, thus avoiding a potential constitutional challenge to its rules. 
However, this strategy backfired. When the FCC filed in Federal 
District Court for the permanent injunction, it also asked for an 
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immediate preliminary injunction , claiming that Free Radio Berkeley's 
continued operation produced "immediate and irreparable harm." 
To this argument, Hiken responded that the station had been on for 
18 months, but the FCC was only now seeking an injunction. "Why did 
they wait for over 18 months to bring it to this court's attention?" Hiken 
asked. During the 18 months, the FCC had repeatedly monitored the 
station, he pointed out, and had only discovered two instances where the 
station's signal interfered with other broadcast signals, and in one of 
the instances the interference was actually caused by the FCC (Hiken, 
1995). Hiken also noted that other low-power stations were on the air, 
such as BLR in Springfield, Illinois, but that the FCC had not sought 
injunctions to shut them down. "If there is an emergency, why is it they 
haven't done anything about that [station]? There's no emergency in this 
case," he said (Black Hat, 1995). 
Hiken also observed that the FCC in Washington had been sitting on 
Dunifer's appeal for a year and had not yet ruled on it. If the FCC believed 
that Free Radio Berkeley presented such a threat to the public interest, it 
should have acted on the appeal, he reasoned. 
The FCC's failure to act on Dunifer's Application for Review gave him 
time to build more transmitters, which were eagerly grabbed by activists 
around the country. In San Francisco's Mission District, Radio Libre signed 
on during the summer of 1994 using a Dunifer-built transmitter. Started by 
a group of Latino street boys and white anarchists on lO3.3 MHz, the station 
broadcast music, political commentary, and Latino community news and 
information (Ferris, 1995). 
In Phoenix, Bill Dougan, emboldened by Dunifer's continued 
operation, put Arizona Free Radio back on to the air, saying, "I do want 
to make a federal case out of it, literally. This is a potential Supreme 
Court case" (Wagner, 1994). In December 1994, Black Liberation 2 took 
to the airwaves in Virginia. Four months later, Free Radio Santa Cruz 
went on the air, broadcasting from another Dunifer-built transmitter. 
Commenting on the sudden growth of free radio stations, Luke Hiken 
said, "I think this is going to get beyond the ability of the FCC to control, 
judging from the snowballing of people interested in setting up 
stations." 
The FCC at a Loss 
Federal District Court judge Claudia Wilken stunned the FCC on January 20, 
1995, when she ruled that its request "for a temporary injunction is hereby 
denied." The FCC's hope that it could avoid addressing the constitutionality 
of its ban on low-power broadcasting was further dashed when Judge Wilken 
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ruled that "the FCC is arguably violating its statutory mandate as well as 
the First Amendment by refusing" to reconsider its rules on micro-radio. 
On the basis of the evidence, she also concluded, "the record does not 
support the ... assertion" that "because Defendant's equipment is not FCC-
approved, it must be considered likely to emit spurious signals without a 
warning" (Wilken, 1995). Wilken 's ruling eventually forced the FCC to 
reconsider its ban on micro-radio. 
The decision so stunned FCC attorney David Silberman that he insult-
ingly informed Judge Wilken: 
Your Honor, this opens up such a can of worms. You don't realize. I mean it. Your 
Honor, what would happen would be that you've given carte blanche to this group 
of people who think they can operate a radio station without a license ... This is 
turning it on its head, Your Honor ... But it opens up such hazards to the public 
interest that I want you to realize what you're doing. -
Judge Wilken replied, "I didn ' t find such egregious hazards on the records. 
1 mean, if there is some further showing that you would want to make at 
some point, 1 can't prevent you from doing that" (Wilken, 1995). 
The decision provided Dunifer and his associates with the opportunity 
to increase the station 's power and hours of operation. Within weeks of the 
decision, the station became a full-fledged 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week oper-
ation, broadcasting on 104.1 FM with 30 watts of power. "It was pretty loose 
at that point. People signed up on a chalk board in time slots and we started 
having meetings," Dunifer says about the operation (Personal communica-
tion, March 4, 1996). The station attracted an eclectic band of volunteers, 
including ecologists, punk rock anarchists, street activists, apolitical musi-
cians, and Latino and African American street youths. Chris Thompson, a 
deejay at the station, concluded "as the months went by, two separate 
impulses emerged among the deejays. While Dunifer and the [activists] saw 
the station as a means to rally the leftist troops and politicize the listeners, 
the punk rock crowd and others mostly wanted to spin tunes for their 
friends" (Personal communication, March 4,1996). The difference in views 
and lack of organization invariably led to conflicts. 
Because of the conflicts, Dunifer moved the station to a north Berkeley 
office, where operations were overseen by a collective. The station 
broadcast from there between July 1996 and March 1997, after which it 
moved to a larger space in a low-income neighborhood, where it could be 
closer to its roots. 
Nine months after Judge Wilken refused to issue a preliminary irtiunction 
stopping Free Radio Berkeley from broadcasting, the FCC issued its decision 
on Dunifer's appeal. As expected, the FCC rejected "Dunifer's argument 
that the Commission's rules abridge an asserted First Amendment right of 
-
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free speech. " The FCC added, "Mr. Dunifer's constitutional arguments 
directly challenge the 50-plus-year statutory approach to licensing broadcast 
transmissions," but failed to mention that for 50-years the FCC had defined 
"public interest" synonymously with commercial broadcasting (FCC, 1995). 
The FCC decision contained a number of misleading assertions. For 
example, the FCC suggested that it might have issued Dunifer a license had 
he applied for one, claiming that "if Mr. Dunifer believes it would be uncon-
stitutional for the FCC to deny him a license, he should have ... asked for a 
license, along with a request for a waiver of the relevant rules limiting low 
power FM service." However, the FCC's suggestion that it might have waived 
the ban on low-power station operation had the commission's procedures 
been followed was untrue, according to John Reed of the FCC's engineer-
ing and technology department in Washington, DC. "I've never heard of 
[the FCC] giving permission like that," Reed said. "There's never been a 
case of our approving this" (Personal communication, May 9, 1997). 
To bolster its claim that it is willing to license low-power stations, the 
FCC wrote, "Contrary to Mr. Dunifer's argument, the Commission's rules do 
not prohibit all low power services. For example, the Commission's rules 
provide for FM translator stations and booster stations which transmit at 
power well below the 100 watt minimum" (FCC, 1995) . In this discussion, 
the FCC failed to mention that translator and booster stations merely retrans-
mit the signals of already licensed, large-power stations-and that nearly all 
translator and booster frequencies have been assigned to corporate 
broadcasters. 
According to the FCC, all it needed to do to win a summary judgment 
was to show that the facts were undisputed (i.e., Free Radio Berkeley was on 
the air) and that the law was on its side (i.e., Free Radio Berkeley did not 
have a license to broadcast). In its request for summary judgment, the FCC 
argued that the Federal District Court had jurisdiction to decide the consti-
tutionality of laws, not rules such as those developed by the FCC, and there-
fore must not address any of the constitutional issues raised by Dunifer. 
The FCC then filed an additional brief asking the court to issue perma-
nent injunctions against the Free Radio Berkeley collective, not just Dunifer, 
as well as Free Radio Santa Cruz and other stations, which the FCC asserted 
were operated by Dunifer. The commission requested the broad injunction 
so that it could avoid having to take individual free stations to court, where 
the constitutionality of its rules could be challenged each time. 
The FCC was hoping for a speedy judgment in District Court, which it 
failed to get. A court decision was expected in spring 1997, but by summer 
the court had not acted. Because of the court's inaction, micro-power 
stations took to the air in almost every other major city and region of the 
United States. In the south, Radio Free Memphis, Free Radio The Bayou in 
Louisiana, and Radio Free Hiram in Georgia appeared. In the Northeast, 
/ 
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there was Steal This Radio (New York City), Radio Mutiny (Philadelphia), and 
JAM-FM (Syracuse). In the Northwest, there was Seattle Liberation Radio, 
Radio Free Portland, and Radio Free Eugene. In the Ohio Valley region, there 
was Free Radio Pittsburgh, Free Radio Indianapolis, and \VIBL (Hamilton, 
OH). In the Midwest, there was KAW-FM (Lawrence, KS), vVNBK (North-
brook, IL), and KCMG-FM (Kansas City). In each instance, the stations pro-
vided services that were unavailable from commercial radio stations. 
For example, Free Radio Memphis (94.7 FM) had a labor show called 
Solidarity Forever, hosted by a member of the Industrial Workers of the 
World. Guests on the show discussed the difficulties and needs of the labor 
movement. "They're not getting on there and expressing something they 
think someone's going to want to buy. They're getting on there and express-
ing things that are very important to them in an everyday sort of way," said 
the show's host, contrasting his guests with those appearing on commercial 
stations (Hanas, 1997). 
Radio Free Memphis also had a feminist show, Grrrl Power Hour, an indie 
hip-hop show, and a community news program that covered stories ignored 
by commercial media. For example, the station aired interviews of activists 
attending peace demonstrations when other media ignored these activists. 
Because of the defeats it suffered inJudge Wilken's courtroom, the FCC 
was reluctant to take direct action against free radio broadcasters, despite 
complaints from commercial broadcasters and lobbying by the National 
Association of Broadcasters (NAB). Instead the commission merely issued 
statements reaffirming its opposition to unlicensed radio operations (FCC 
Audio Services Division, 1996). 
As complaints from commercial broadcasters mounted, the FCC 
eventually targeted for closure a few unlicensed stations in the South and 
Midwest-far from Judge Wilken 's court. In addition to their geographiC 
locations, the targeted unlicensed stations had several things in common: 
they were operated by individuals without community participation, and 
their programs often differed from those of most micro-radio broadcasters, 
which usually spoke for disenfranchised communities. 
The strategy that the FCC pursued in each case was the same. FCC 
agents accompanied by law enforcement officials seized the stations' trans-
mitters, rather than seeking an injunction against them, as the commission 
had done with Free Radio Be rkeley. By seizing the transmitters, the FCC 
immediately put the free radio broadcasters off the air and on the defen-
sive, requiring them to go to court to get their transmitters back, where they 
would be required to show that they had a legal right to operate the trans-
mitters. Proving this in court would be impossible. 
The first station the FCC targeted was Lutz Community Radio near 
Tampa, Florida, operated by Lonnie Kobres, a member of the "constitution-
alist movement," which was incorrectly identified with the far-right militia 
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movement. The FCC was aware for many months that Kobres's station was 
on the air, having first monitored its broadcasts on October 31, 1995. Mter 
the monitoring, the FCC sent Kobres letters informing him that the broad-
casts were illegal. 
On March 8, 1996, less than a year after the bombing of the Alfred P. 
Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City, which spawned a frenzy of 
media reports that equated "constitutionalists" such as Kobres with the 
Oklahoma City bombers, federal agents with search warrants raided 
the Lutz radio station and seized its transmitter. The widespread public 
antipathy to the far-right movement that resulted from the Oklahoma City 
bombing and the media's coverage of it made Kobres an easy target, 
although the FCC denied that Kobres was targeted because of his political 
views (Sommer, 1996). 
In June 1996, the FCC raided Black Liberation 2 in Richmond, Virginia, 
which had been on the air for less than six months. The station was oper-
ated by Jahi Kubweza and his family, rather than a community group, and 
patterned after the Illinois-based free station of the same name. As with 
Lutz Community Radio, FCC agents visited Kubweza's home, demanded to 
see the transmitter, and then seized it (Kubweza, 1996). 
The FCC used a similar approach to silence The Beat, a station oper-
ated by Alan Freed in Minneapolis that carried dance music. The 20-watt 
station, based in Freed's apartment, signed on July 21, 1996, and soon 
attracted an audience in Minneapolis's hip Uptown neighborhood. The sta-
tion also attracted the enmity of commercial broadcasting corporations and 
the Minnesota Broadcasters Association, which almost immediately filed 
complaints with the FCC (Groebner, 1996). 
In August, the FCC responded to the complaints, sending Freed a letter 
warning him that he could be fined and imprisoned for operating a radio 
station without a license. Freed responded with a letter challenging the 
constitutionality of the FCC's rules banning low-power radio stations. 
He continued broadcasting, despite the warning letter (Lambert, 1996). 
In October, the FCC went before a federal magistrate and asked for an 
arrest warrant directing the U.S. marshal to seize Freed's transmitter. The 
court issued the warrant and in November, the transmitter was seized. 
A month later, on December 11, 1996, FCC agents from Tampa traveled 
to Orlando to investigate a complaint filed by local broadcasters against an 
unlicensed station broadcasting on 106.5 FM. Like The Beat, the Orlando 
station broadcast music rather than community affairs programs. As they 
did in Lutz, Richmond, and Minneapolis, the agents confiscated this 
station's transmitting equipment, thereby silencing the station (FCC Com-
pliance and Information Bureau, 1996). 
Kobres and Freed responded to the seizures by filing claims in federal 
court, requesting the FCC to return their equipment because the seizures 
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were unlawful. Both challenged the constitutionality of FCC rules governing 
low-power broadcasting in their filings . Kobres also acquired another trans-
mitter and put Lutz Community Radio back on the air, something neither 
Kubweza nor Freed attempted. 
It took the U.S. District Courts in Florida and Minnesota about a year 
to rule on Kobres's and Freed's claims. On August 24, 1997, the court in 
Florida upheld the government's seizure of Kobres's transmitter. On 
September 5,1997, the court in Minnesota also decided in the FCC's favor. 
The Minnesota court also ruled that the U.S. Court of Appeals, not Dis-
trict Courts, have jurisdiction over the constitutionality of FCC rules, as 
the FCC had argued. The Minnesota decision handed the FCC a decision 
that it had failed to get inJudge Wilken's court and a green light to move 
against free radio broadcasters in districts outside of the San Francisco 
Bay area. 
The FCC~s Offensive 
It did not take long after the Florida and Minnesota decisions for the 
FCC to start an offensive against unlicensed broadcasters. Within weeks, 
the FCC was notifying unlicensed stations to close down and dispatching 
agents to seize the "stuff." On September 4,1997, FCC agents and U.S. mar-
shals raided a pirate station in Howell, New Jersey, that called itself Oldies 
104.7 FM. This station differed from most micro-power stations in that it car-
ried commercials, promoted itself on billboards, and was a member of the 
local chamber of commerce. The station's operator, Salvatore DeRogatis, 
was apparently stunned by the raid. "I thought they would never shut me 
down because of what had happened in California," said DeRogatis, allud-
ing to Judge Wilken's decision, but apparen tly unaware that the decision 
applied only to that court district (Broadcasting, 1997; Ryan, 1997) . 
Two weeks later, FCC agents, backed by 12 federal marshals and 6 sheriffs 
deputies, seized the equipment of Community Power Radio, an unlicensed 
station that broadcast to African Americans in the Oak Park neighborhood of 
Sacramento, California (Larson, 1997). 
In October 1997, the FCC also shut down several stations, including 
105.5 FM in Miami , 106.5 FM in West Palm Beach, KCMG-FM in Kansas 
City, and Radio Free Allston, a high-profile community station in Boston 
(Florida Times-Union, 1997; Perrin, 1997). The high profile of Radio Free 
Alston was the result of its being operated openly with widespread public 
partici pation. 
In November 1997, the FCC continued its attempts to silence unli-
censed stations. FCC agents in Tampa, Florida, simultaneously raided Tem-
ple Terrace Community Radio (a.k.a. Tampa's Party Pirate) , Radio Free 
Tampa Bay (a.k.a. 87X), and Lutz Community Radio on November 19. The 
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raids, although consistent with what the FCC was doing in other parts of the 
United States, were due in part to Temple Terrace Community Radio 
founder Doug Brewer's increasingly brazen attitude toward the FCC. Brewer 
had increased the station's power to 125 watts, making it audible through-
out much of Tampa, and it started carrying commercials for small busi-
nesses, including used record stores and strip joints. Brewer printed up 
bumper stickers promoting the station as "Tampa's Party Pirate-l02.1 FM" 
and T-shirts reading, "License? We don't need no stinking license." 
Brewer's activities were such that they were covered in a front-page story 
in the Wall Street journal, in which Brewer challenged the FCC to take 
action. "It's going, it's visible, and it just plain rocks," said Brewer about the 
Party Pirate. Ralph Barlow, the district director of the FCC's Tampa field 
office, responded that Brewer's taunts were "not good" for FCC employee 
morale. "This guy is going off the deep end," Barlow said. "Sooner or later 
I'll nail him" (Orwall, 1997). 
Barlow acted sooner rather than later, ostensibly on a complaint filed by 
commercial station WHPT-FM. At 6:30 a.m. on November 19, 1997, gun-
toting police, FCC agents, and federal marshals pounded on the door of 
Brewer's home. Brewer awakened, thinking he had heard thunder. When 
he finally opened the door, Brewer was handcuffed. During the next 12 
hours, FCC agents disassembled the studio of the unlicensed station, which 
was located in Brewer's garage, and seized everything that resembled broad-
casting equipment (Cockburn, 1997; Danielson, 1997a,b) . 
A few miles away, FCC agents and U.S. marshals simultaneously raided 
the homes of Kelly Kombat and Lonnie Kobres, seizing the transmitters of 
87X and Lutz Community Radio. Of the three unlicensed broadcasters 
arrested in Tampa that morning, only Kobres was charged with felonies for 
broadcasting without a license. He was charged because he continued to 
broadcast after the previous raid, not because of his political viewpoints, 
federal officials contended (Solov, 1997a). "Ninety illegal broadcasters have 
been shut down in the past year with no more action than sending letters or 
visiting them and delivering warnings," an FCC official explained about the 
felony charges. "Still , we do want to get across to the public that this is a seri-
ous matter, and what the consequences there are to public safety and to the 
broadcasters themselves" (Curtius, 1998). 
The Micro-power R£sponse 
News of the FCC raids in Tampa were distributed nationwide almost imme-
diately over the Internet to other micro-radio broadcasters, who encour-
aged Brewer, Kombat, and Kobres to organize a local movement protesting 
the FCC's actions. A national committee was established to raise money for 
Kobres's defense, which used the Internet to solicit funds. 
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In Tampa, supporters of the unlicensed stations swamped the FCC and 
vVHPT-FM with protest calls. The calls were so frequent that the FCC 
and ""HPT stopped answering their phones, and WHPT general manager 
Drew Rashbaum refused to comment about his station's complaint because of 
the harassment it had received from "obnoxious listeners" of the unlicensed 
station, as Rashbaum referred to them. 
Protest demonstrations against the FCC raids were organized in Tampa. 
On Tuesday, November 25, more than 100 supporters of the unlicensed 
stations gathered in front of the FCC's Tampa office. "They're not going to 
get rid of us," declared Party Pirate deejay Matthew Adelman, one of the 
many dozens of protesters who assembled at the federal office with placards 
reading, "Federal Censorship Commission" and """hat Good is Free Speech 
if You Can't Hear Us?" (Solov, 1997b). 
Despite these actions, the FCC continued its assault on micro-power 
radio. On December 9, 1997, FCC agents visited tIre Old Firehouse Cafe in 
Anchorage, Alaska, from where Free Radio Spenard broadcast. The agents 
said they would return and confiscate the equipment, if the station were not 
silenced. "We turned it off Tuesday night after having a meeting," said a 
Free Radio Spenard volunteer (Dunham, 1997). 
Over the Internet, the micro-power movement organized a letter 
writing and e-mail campaign directed at FCC Chairman William Kennard, 
pressuring him to change FCC policies. In addition, newspaper reports 
about the FCC's campaign against unlicensed broadcasters continued to be 
published, often carrying quotes from unlicensed broadcasters that were 
embarrassing to the FCC. For example, the Florida Times-Union of Jackson-
ville published a story about the FCC's crackdown on unlicensed stations 
that quoted Doug Brewer, who described his arrest. "It was a surprise attack. 
They came in with a real vengeance," he reported. "If I were a drug dealer 
or a murderer, that would be different story. All I had was a radio transmit-
ter. I wasn't hurting anybody" (Florida Times-Union, 1997). 
The pressure and continuing publicity caused the FCC in February 1998 
to dust off a petition to establish a micro-radio broadcasting system that had 
been sitting in its files for six months. The petition that the FCC initially 
put on the table was as conservative as possible: It proposed that micro-
broadcasters be assigned just one frequency in each broadcasting band and 
that, high schools and universities, not community groups, be given priority 
in the licensing process. The proposal also limited low-power stations to 
one watt. Moreover, the proposal suggested that micro-stations might also 
be commercial, providing access for "entrepreneurs" who are "motivated by 
the prospect of genuine wealth." Thus, the petition never addressed any of 
the inequities against which the micro-radio movement was rebelling. 
Despite the conservatism of this micro-radio station proposal, the NAB, 
the trade, and lobby organization for commercial broadcasting industry, 
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quickly announced its opposition to all low-power radio broadcasting. NAB 
President Edward Fritts said, "At a time when spectrum used for radio sta-
tions is overly congested, it would be folly to authorize hundreds of addi-
tional low-power stations that would surely cause additional interference" 
(McConnell, 1998). Other representatives of commercial broadcasting also 
spoke out against micro-radio broadcasting, confirming what had been 
believed by most micro-radio broadcasters all along-that commercial 
broadcasters were opposed to micro-radio stations not because they oper-
ated without licenses but because the stations represented competition. 
These stations had attracted listeners who were disenchanted with commer-
cial radio programming. Thus, micro-radio stations, regardless of whether 
they were legal or illegal, threatened the very raison d'etre of the U.S. system 
of corporate broadcasting. 
Although commercial broadcasters opposed the licensing of low-power 
stations, most responses to the FCC's initial proposal favored low-power radio, 
and asked the FCC to expand rather than limit the service. About one year 
later, on January 28,1999, the FCC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
seeking com men ts on the creation of a low-power service for stations broad-
casting with substantially greater power than it first proposed-between 10 
and 1,000 watts, instead of just 1 watt. The FCC announced that it would 
accept comments on the rulemaking notice until August 2, and would 
accept reply comments until September 1 (FCC, 1999). 
During the seven-month comment period, the FCC received more than 
3,000 comments, far more than it received on other proposed rulemakings. 
The vast majority supported a low-power radio service; opposition was pri-
marily from already-licensed broadcasters, including National Public Radio 
and its affiliates, and broadcast trade associations, such as the NAB. The FCC 
was apparently surprised by the number and diversity of comments it 
received, observing that comments came "from churches or other religious 
organizations, students, labor unions, community organizations and activists, 
musicians and other citizens [that] reflect a broad interest in service from 
highly local radio stations grounded in their communities" (FCC, 2000, 3). 
Because of the widespread support for low-power radio-and the criti-
cism that the FCC suffered in the courts and through the press-the agency 
announced inJanuary 2000 that it was establishing a low-power radio service 
and a process to apply for low-power FM licenses. In its Report and Order, 
the FCC addressed technical, ownership, and operating issues (FCC, 2000). 
In terms of technical standards, the FCC determined that low-power stations 
could operate on third adjacent channels without creating "significant new 
interference to the service of existing FM stations," even though the NAB 
and other broadcasters asserted that interference would occur (FCC, 2000, 
42). As for ownership, the FCC decided to grant low-power licenses to non-
profit organizations, not individuals, and required the organizations to be 
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community based (i.e., to have a local chapter or branch within 10 miles of 
the station they operate). Each organization could operate no more than 
one station in each market, a policy that the NAB asserted violated the Tele-
communication Act of 1996. Lastly, the FCC decided that two classes of low-
power stations would be established-lO watt and 100 watt. This policy was 
supported in the comments of most citizens, activists, and community orga-
nizations, which opposed establishing a new WOO-watt service that, like exist-
ing commercial stations, would not serve local communities. 
Almost immediately, the NAB and other broadcast lobbyists asked 
Congress to overturn the FCC's Report and Order. Three members of Con-
gress who acted at the behest of the broadcasting industry were Sen. Rod 
Gramms (R-MN), Rep. Michael Oxley (R-OH), and Rep. Billy Tauzin (R-LA). 
Gramms and Oxley sponsored nearly identical bills, which in amended form 
became known as the Radio Broadcasting Preservation Act of 2000, which 
rolled back the FCC's Report and Order. Tauzin, ;i!; Commerce Committee 
chair, held hearings on low-power FM that rested on two assumptions: one, 
the FCC had exceeded its power by creating a low-power radio service, and, 
two, the service would interfere with existing stations. Rep. Heather Wilson 
(R-NM) summarized these sentiments in a statement about the amended 
Radio Broadcasting Preservation Act before the House, saying, "The FCC 
was moving too quickly and I believe compromising the quality of the radio 
reception that we get in our communities" (Wilson, 2000, H2305). 
The Radio Broadcasting Preservation Act of 2000 was passed by the 
House, and Gramm's bill (S. 3020) was inserted as a rider into the District 
of Columbia Appropriations Act, which was passed, and signed into law by 
President Clinton. This effectively derailed the FCC's policy for creating a 
low-power service. The bill did not eliminate low-power FM; instead, it 
required the FCC to "prescribe minimum distance separations to third adja-
cent channels," thereby barring the stations from operating on third 
adjacent channels, as the FCC had approved. The law essentially eliminated 
100-watt stations from operating in all but the smallest markets, and 
restricted licensing of lO-watt stations to medium-sized and small markets 
with less frequency congestion and wider channel separation. The largest 
cities, such as San Francisco, New York, Philadelphia, Milwaukee, and 
Tampa, where the free radio movement found its voice, were deprived of 
low-power stations by the legislation. 
Low-power FM stations have taken to the air in small and medium-sized 
markets, but the majority do not sound like, or in any way resemble, the unli-
censed stations that broadcast during the late 1990s. Most of the applicants 
for low-power stations have been religious congregations, rather than 
community groups. The stations of these congregations feature biblical 
readings and discussions, sermons, and religious music, which were already 
available on FM dial. 
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Notes 
1. FCC agent Philip Kane told the Express newspaper (August 13, 1993, 14) that he 
received complaints about Free Radio Berkeley from "several" licensed stations, which 
caused him to monitor and track the station. After the National Lawyers Guild news-
paper, Conspiracy, filed a Freedom of Information Act request for copies of the com-
plaints, Kane and the agency claimed that the "complaints or inquiries were made in 
person or by telephone and that no documents or other records were compiled ... and 
that the individuals ... had expressly requested confidentiality." See" Memorandum and 
Order," 10 FCC Rcd 2155 (January 13, 1995 ). A separate examination of a complaint 
about Free Radio Berkeley that the FCC claims to have received from KFOG, a com-
mercial station in San Francisco, "appears to have been prompted by FCC prodding." 
The FCC received the "complaint" from the station's corporate vice president in New 
York, who wrote the FCC after hearing about the station at a National Association of 
Broadcasters (NAB) convention in Las Vegas, in which FCC officials spoke. The NAB 
is the trade association and lobbying group for commercial broadcasters. See Walker 
(1995). 
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